




From Socrates’ admonition to know oneself
and his claim that the unexamined life is not
worth living, the self has occupied a central
place in philosophical and scientific inquiry.
Debates about the self include metaphysical
questions on the nature and reality of selfhood,
empirical questions about the developmental
and historical trajectory of the human selves,
and ethical questions about agency, respon-
sibility, and autonomy. The answers to these
metaphysical, empirical, and ethical questions
are intertwined, as the nature of selfhood both
constrains and enables the range of moral and
political actions the individual engages with
in a social world. This entry focuses on the
realist and antirealist positions on the meta-
physical question of the reality of the self and
its scientific investigation. Realism has two
fundamental commitments about the world
posited by scientific theories: existence and
evaluation-independence. According to the
existence claim, both the everyday world of
objects and their properties—the subject of
scientific theorizing—do exist. According to
the evaluation-independence claim, the objects
and properties posited by a scientific theory
exist independent from what human beings
think about them or how they are linguistically
articulated. As a corollary, realists about the
self argue that the self exists; its features are
evaluation independent; and these features can
be scientifically investigated. Antirealists on the
other hand suggest that there is no such thing
as the self, that it is merely a construct and
what is identified as its features are contingent
upon cultural and linguistic practices.
The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Robin L. Cautin and Scott O. Lilienfeld.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118625392.wbecp519
The Cartesian notion of the self sets the
stage for both the realist and the antirealist
approaches. In Meditations, Descartes seeks to
investigate the grounds for his beliefs about
the world. He explores whether any of his
ordinary beliefs could survive methodical
doubt. He goes so far as to doubt the existence
of the external world itself by positing that an
evil demon could make humans perceive the
external world even if one did not exist. In this
process, the only thing that Descartes cannot
doubt is the fact that he is thinking. Thus,
the very activity of thinking (i.e., doubting) is
evidence of his own existence: “I must finally
conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist,
is necessarily true whenever it is put forward
by me or conceived in my mind” (Descartes,
1641/1968).
Descartes concludes that he knows one thing
with certainty, the existence of a thinking
substance, his “self.” According to Descartes
reality is made up of two fundamental kinds
of substance: mental and material. Human
beings, as parts of reality, are constituted by the
mental, which has no extension in space, and
the material, which is extended but is void of
thoughts. Descartes’ dualism about substances
has given rise to the famous mind–body
problem, one of the most important topics
in philosophy of mind. Descartes constrains
selfhood to immaterial substance only.The self
is a thinking “thing,” or metaphysically simple,
unified, bounded, determinate, permanent,
independent, and self-transparent substance
(Descartes, 1641/1968). The Cartesian view
of mind then allows us to specify what makes
a person the same person over time: it is not
the body; it is the possession of the immutable
thing that constitutes the self. This mental
substance makes the self the same unchanging
entity from birth to death and possibly beyond.
To summarize, for Descartes the self exists
as a nonphysical and evaluation-independent
entity; that is, it is there even if no one knows
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about it. Because it is compatible with most
theologies that postulate souls existing in an
independent “realm” of existence distinct from
that of the physical world, and also because it
resonates with common sense, Descartes’s view
has dominated modern European philosophy.
Most of the realist and the antirealist views
on the self have been developed in reference
to the Cartesian self. Antirealists deny the
existence of the self by arguing that there is
no such thing as the self. Rather the self is an
illusion, a fiction of the mind.There would not
be such a thing that we call the self if there
was no one to perceive it. They further deny
the evaluation-independence claim, arguing
that the concept of the self is invented by
cultural, social, and linguistic conventions,
and it is nothing but a useful conceptual tool
for organizing human experience. Unlike
what a Cartesian claims, there is no substance
such as the self, the self is not a determinate,
timeless, unified, and bounded thing. In fact,
for the antirealists, this malleable nature of
the self is evidence that the self cannot be a
evaluation-independent and real thing in the
way that chemical elements such as gold are
(e.g., Dennett, 1991; Foucault, 1979; Rorty,
1989).
Contemporary realists argue that there is
such a thing as the self (the self exists) and
it is evaluation-independent. Selves would
exist even if even if our social, cultural, and
linguistic conventions did not, but that they
would be more impoverished than they cur-
rently are. However, most realists also deny the
Cartesian view of the self as an immutable and
unchanging thing from birth to death.
Realism about the self comes in different
varieties. While some realists defend the exis-
tence of the self by committing themselves to
the existence of a substance—whether material
or immaterial—others take issue with Carte-
sian commitment to substance. Instead they
observe the phenomenological experience of
the self and pay attention to the empirical
evidence drawn from cognitive sciences and
neuroscience. They relax the Cartesian limi-
tations on the self as permanent, stable, and
nonchanging, but still construe it as real (e.g.,
Flanagan, 1991; Jopling, 1997; Neisser, 1988).
There are also some realists who claim that
the self is real but remain agnostic about its
nature (Graham, 2000; Kennedy & Graham,
2006). Further, some construe antirealism as
a reaction to the Cartesian account of the self;
once we abandon the Cartesian definition of
the self, antirealism will no longer be a viable
view (Graham, 2000; Jopling, 1997; Kennedy
& Graham, 2006).
Antirealists are represented by a number
of continental philosophers with postmod-
ern leanings, for example Richard Rorty and
Michel Foucault, and a number of contempo-
rary analytic philosophers, for example Daniel
Dennett. Realists include psychologists and
empirically informed philosophers of mind
including William James, Owen Flanagan,
Ulric Neisser, and George Graham.
Varieties of Antirealism about
the Self
Postmodern philosophers are opposed to the
Cartesian account of the self as a unified,
permanent, evaluation-independent sub-
stance that is impervious to perturbations and
changes. In their view, the self is construct that
can be shaped in as many diverse ways as is
socially, culturally, and linguistically possible.
Unlike the Cartesian assumption, there are no
a priori limits on the ways in which selves can
be created and recreated, because there is no
singular determinate self to begin with. When
it comes to the self, there are no facts.This view
is summarized in such propositions as “there
is no such thing as the self,” “the self is an illu-
sion,” and “there is no thinking, experiencing
subject” (Kennedy & Graham, 2006).
The phenomenal experience of having a
self—that is, feelings of agency and intention-
ality, acting according to beliefs and desires,
and being embedded in and interacting with
a physical and social environment—provide
apparent evidence of the existence of the self.
However, for antirealists, such phenomenal
information is not objectively grounded; rather,
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it shows variation across subjects. Because it
is impoverished, such information is usually
enriched or crafted by metaphors, narratives,
and symbols.
Michel Foucault argues that the self is not
a hidden metaphysical substance that can be
unearthed, but has developed historically as
a correlate of cultural and social institutions
(Foucault, 1979). This means, for instance,
that the concept of the self had different con-
notations in Ancient Greek society from its
connotations in contemporary society. Thus,
what people consider as the self is not a fixed,
unchanging thing, as Descartes postulated it,
but an evolving concept dependent on cultural
and social practices and relationships.
Similar to Foucault,Richard Rorty argues that
there is no unchanging metaphysical substance
such as the self. While Foucault emphasized
the idea that the self is a product of society and
culture, Rorty also considers it to be a product
of linguistic practices (Rorty, 1989). Just as an
author or a poet creates a novel or poem from
scratch, a person creates and transforms herself
through the stories (or narratives) she tells to
herself about herself at particular times in
particular situations.Thus, just like a novel or
a poem, the self is a contingent phenomenon;
it is dependent on the subject’s perceptions and
evaluations of herself. For Rorty, this makes
the realist claim that the self is a timeless, fixed
unity, wrong.
A contemporary philosopher of mind and
cognitive science, Daniel Dennett also defends
the antirealist view of the self also by appeal-
ing to the stories or narratives we tell about
ourselves. Unlike Rorty, however, Dennett is
interested in psychology and cognitive sci-
ences, rather than the activity of novelists or
poets. Dennett vocalizes the two antirealist
commitments and argues that the self does not
exist as a concrete thing, nor as a metaphysical
substance, and that what is considered as the
self is not evaluation-independent (Dennett,
1991). Each “normal” individual of the species
Homo sapiens, for Dennett, creates a self by
spinning stories about herself in the process of
presenting herself to others through language.
The tendency to create selves by way of creating
stories, for humans, is akin to how spiders
weave webs to protect themselves; it is both
intrinsic and unconscious (Dennett, 1991).
Because it is constructed and abstracted
out of narratives, the self is permeable and
flexible. Dennett uses multiple personality
disorder to illustrate his ideas (Dennett &
Humphrey, 1989; see also Graham, 2000 for
a detailed discussion). For Dennett the mul-
tiple personalities claimed to be possessed
by the same body are difficult to individ-
uate, both by the individual and others,
because the self is not a real thing that is easily
identifiable.
Varieties of Realism about the Self
Realists object to the antirealist claim that the
self is not a real thing but fiction, a product
of the social, cultural, and linguistic conven-
tions, for three reasons. First, they assert that
phenomenal experience of selfhood (conscious
experience) manifests a physically embodied
and socially embedded configuration; as a
result, empirical research in the sciences of
the mind provides robust reasons to deny
antirealism. Second, they argue that those
antirealists who argue that the self is a fiction
because the evidence for the reality of the self is
subjectively variant are confusing self-concepts
(how the self represents itself to itself) with
the self. While the linguistic representations
of the self, i.e., self-concepts, are manifest in
the social, cultural, and linguistic world, they
are also grounded on the physical body. The
embodiment and the developmental trajectory
of the self provide objective and universal
facts about human selves. Third, they declare
that the antirealist position is based on overly
stringent expectations of what the self must be
in order to exist.
William James has made major contributions
to a realist picture of the self that is respon-
sive to the experience of ordinary human
beings. For James, the self is constituted by
four different—but complementary—selves:
(a) the material self, (b) the social self, (c) the
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spiritual self, and (d) the pure ego.The material
self includes the body; there is a certain kind
of intimacy that each person feels toward their
own body. For example, we feel our own hunger
more intimately than we do the hunger of oth-
ers, even though we may empathize with them.
The material self also includes clothes, wealth,
and immediate family. For instance, referring
to the family, James writes, “when they die a
part of ourselves is gone” (James, 1890/1983).
The social self is constituted by the recognition
that one gets from interpersonal relationships.
Humans are “gregarious animals” who have an
innate tendency to be noticed favorably and
to seek the respect of others.The spiritual self
involves moral sensibility, conscience, and the
will. Finally, the pure ego is the self of selves,
which mediates between the ideas of the self
and its actions in the world. The self of selves
can be viewed as self-consciousness because it
is active whenever the individual is conscious
of something; for example, when uttering
a word.
William James is a realist, committed to the
claim that the self is a real phenomenon, a
complex language-independent entity with
several constituents. His investigation of
the self follows both the phenomenological
method, where he uses his own experience
of himself as a framework to understand the
self, and the scientific method, where he uses
psychopathological cases, such as multiple
personality, to theorize his account. Unlike
Dennett who used multiple personality to
argue for an antirealist approach to the self,
James uses psychopathology as evidence for
the claim that there are selves.
In addition to being an important figure
in the development of cognitive psychology,
Ulric Neisser also helped found the ecological
psychology movement. This movement was
triggered by worries about the exclusive focus
of the field of cognitive psychology on com-
puter modeling and information processing.
Ecological psychologists challenge cognitive
psychology not to confine itself to the lab-
oratory but to also study how actual people
interact in the world outside the laboratory.
Neisser argues that the forms of information
that individuate the self are so different from
one another that it is plausible to suggest that
each form of information establishes a differ-
ent “self” (Neisser, 1988). Neisser’s different
selves are (a) the ecological self, or the self that
perceives and who is situated in the physical
world; (b) the interpersonal self, or the self
embedded in the social world who develops
through intersubjectivity; (c) the extended
self, or the self in time that is grounded on
memory of the past and anticipation about the
future; (d) the private self, or the self of private
experiences that are not available to others;
and (e) the conceptual self, or the self that
represents the self to itself by drawing on the
properties of the self and the social, cultural,
and linguistic context to which it belongs. Even
though these selves specified by five different
kinds of information are not experienced as
distinct and independent, they differ in their
developmental histories; for instance, the eco-
logical and intersubjective selves start at birth,
whereas the conceptual self develops with the
development of language.
An empirically informed philosopher of
mind and moral psychologist, Owen Flanagan
is also a proponent of realism about the self.
He carves the self into what he calls the “actual
full identity” and “self-represented identity,”
hoping to account for the self from both an
objective point of view (via a complete science
of mind, behavior, and personality) and a sub-
jective point of view (via subject’s self-reports
at a given time and place). Actual full identity
is a dynamic integrated system of individ-
ual’s past and present identifications, desires,
commitments, aspirations, beliefs, disposi-
tions, temperaments, roles, acts, and actional
patterns, as well as her self-understandings
(even the incorrect ones) (Flanagan, 1991).
Self-represented identity is a collection of
various representations of actual full identity.
Self-representations, in this sense, never have
direct access to actual full identity; they can
only approximate it with varying degrees of
success.
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Committed to realist intuitions, Flanagan
argues there is a self and it is multiplex; that is,
the various self-representations are collected
into a single autobiographical narrative by the
subject, who performs “active authorial work”
to integrate her memories about the past, plans
about the future, various projects, and so on
(Flanagan, 1991). Such a narrative warrants
the psychological connectedness possible in a
first-person perspective, thereby reiterating the
person over time. Self-representations, through
such autobiographical narratives, shape actual
full identity in two senses.
First, when considered as a cognitive activ-
ity, representing one’s self involves activating
certain mental representations and cog-
nitive structures. This activity realigns,
recasts, and modifies the representations
already in place. For instance, a subject
representing herself as a vegan activist fight-
ing for animal rights realigns her other
self-representations, such as her partici-
pation in demonstrations, the articles she
publishes in the local newspaper about
the unethical treatment of animals, and
so on.
Second, the self as represented has moti-
vational bearings and behavioral effects.
In this case, the subject’s placement of her
self-conception in motivational circuits fine
tunes her actions. For instance, having rep-
resented herself as a vegan activist fighting
for animal rights, she might feel motivated
to change people’s attitudes and campaign
to get more people to read her articles. Such
activities are constitutive of the subject’s actual
full identity (Flanagan, 1991). Note that, just
like Rorty and Dennett, Flanagan draws atten-
tion to the importance of narratives and the
social and cultural factors in the formation of
the self; however, unlike the former two, he
uses these arguments to argue for the reality
of the self. In this respect, Flanagan’s realism
accommodates both the realist claim that there
is such a thing as the self, and the antirealist
attempts to explain how social, cultural, and
linguistic factors are influential in shaping
the self.
A contemporary philosopher of mind and
cognitive science,George Graham is committed
to the claim that the self is real, but is agnostic
about what the self is. His realism is grounded
on what he calls the manifestation thesis,
whereby a subject’s conscious experiences
manifest themselves as modifications of her
own experience. For example, whenwe become
conscious of an experience such as seeing a
flower, we perceive that experience as ours, not
as someone else’s seeing of a flower. Such self-
consciousness reveals to us that there is a self,
but it does not reveal whether the self is a
material or immaterial phenomenon.
In Graham’s view, antirealists who question
the existence of the self overestimate what we
know about the self; they mistakenly believe
that being a realist commits someone to a
Cartesian substance called the self, forcing
them to abandon realism altogether. However,
if we relax the stringent Cartesian demands
on selfhood and remain agnostic about its
ontology, we will find realism plausible. In
addition, antirealists argue for antirealism by
claiming selves are indeterminate. However, for
Graham, the indeterminacy of the self does not
require conceding that it is unreal. According
to Graham, the theoretical temptation to use
determinacy to distinguish real from unreal
selves should be resisted.
He suggests that describing the ontology of
self requires knowing a complete set of meta-
physical truths about the self, including truths
about self/brain (body) relations, the nature of
consciousness and intentionality, and personal
identity across time. He is skeptical that we can
ever know such truths; therefore, the best strat-
egy is to commit to the existence of selves, but
remain agnostic about what they may be (Gra-
ham, 2000).
SEE ALSO: Descartes’ Model of the Mind; Psycho-
metric Validity; Social Constructionism
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